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ABSTRACT / INTRODUCTION : 
From the Borromean knotting of concepts world, scene and obscene which represent the material, 
symbolic and mythological dimensions of our environment, the article explains the process of 
civilization at work in our societies. In our view, this process characterized itself by the 
obscene placing – to put behind the scene, in French mise obscène – of an important part of our 
environment. It is specific to the social animal that is the human being. When he stands on the scene, 
he always hides a part of his condition. The one he is ashamed because it places him in front of the 
ontological void that constitutes him.  
The modern movement radicalized this process by elevating the obscene placing up to a principle. 
This principle constitutes, in our opinion, a denial of together : the complexity of the human being, the 
fragility of his environment and the specificity of his condition. However, it was the way, followed by 
the moderns, to hide themselves the ontological void which they were nevertheless constituted. As a 
result appears a new man, a man without condition which, surrounded by the comforting decor of the 
scene, has lost the consciousness of both, its constitutive frailty (body and environment) and the 
destructive nature of its own way of life. If one refers to scientific forecasts, he now runs blindly 
towards an imminent ecological drama that could end with nothing other than the inhabitability of his 
own planet. 
This opens a double urgency: first, to identify and understand the devices at work in the process of 
obscene placing and subsequently, to reflect on how to change them. It being understood that human 
awareness would impact its behavior and, thus, would influence the catastrophic projections of 
our scientists. 
According to our interpretation of the Lacanian definition of primitive architecture, it can 
be considered as one of those devices because it allows the man to isolate the obscene from the 
scene (Jungers 2015). Hence, we hypothesize, to open what follows, that the plausibility of the 
mimesis is related to the mimetic power of architecture. Mimesis and mimetic would, therefore, be 
two sides of the same coin. Mimesis is ideational. It traditionally regulates the imitative arts in the 
way nature has to be represented. Mimetic is material. It allows some animals to survive in this 
nature by using, according to Roger Caillois, three strategies: intimidation, transvestism and 
camouflage. 
To clarify the links between mimesis and mimetic, we will draw hereafter, the contours of 
this particular animal that is the man, at the same time, talking, symbolic and social animal. On the 
way we will approach the issues of mimesis and mimetic which will allow us to conclude by 
pointing three devices used by architecture to hide the obscene: the wall (hiding), the type 
(meaning) and the parergon (sublimation). These three devices enable the human being not only to 
hide from himself the obscene, but more than that, to hide from himself that architecture which itself 
hides.  
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HOMO SAPIENS 
Why would the human animal be different from the other animals? How could we consider that he is 
not, he would reply, him who became the first geological force of the planet (Anthropocene)? How to 
explain this unique rise in the animal kingdom, him yet that nothing originally predestined, to the 
hegemony of the living, considering his constitutive fragility compared with other animal species? 
Talking animal 
We will respond first, that the human being is a talking animal. He is able, like many other animal 
species, to produce signs understandable by someone else. Excepting one difference : only the human 
language allows to bring to the consciousness of each other, things that do not exist (Harari 2015). 
Only the man is able to point a phenomenon or to invoke a transcendental idea and thereby able to 
mobilize a group in the name of that idea. Values, beliefs, symbols, ... constitute the “mythical glue” 
(Harari 2015) which allows the multitude to act as one man, offsetting the weakness that originally 
characterized the human animal. 
Symbolic animal 
We answer, then, that man is a symbolic animal. From this ability to deal with the non-existent 
appears in the head of the human animal, the consciousness of the indetermination of his own 
existence and, with it, the perception of a void. This essential void or ontological void generates a 
lacking, that of meaning. For Sartre, the real particularity of the human being is that he feels the need 
to define his own essence, i.e. his place in the light of the “Great Whole”. Therefore, the human 
animal searches, by necessity, a transcendental logic, a “world” because, on the representation of it, 
will depend the definition of his essence, his function, his role. This role in whose name he will 
transform his environment to accommodate the scene. Von Uexküll, whom we mentioned above, does 
not escape the rule when he concludes his book “a foray into the worlds of animals and humans” by 
introducing us to the idea of the “One”. “If one wanted to sum up [the] objective characteristics [of the 
different environments, he said], only chaos would result. And yet, all these different environments are 
fostered and borne along by the One that is inaccessible to all environments forever” (von Uexküll 
1956). Despite its inaccessibility, von Uexküll thus poses that a transcendental coherence does exist 
just like the tree around which many animals and insects live without being aware of its existence. 
This transcendental coherence, he calls it welt, literally “world”. 
The symbolic animal which is man finds himself driven by the lack of meaning. So much that he can 
be seen as the prisoner of “meaning”. Originally it was even “very difficult [for him] to distinguish 
between the two spheres of the being and the meaning” (Cassirer 1975). This is, for example, the case 
with the Hopi, an indian animist society of Arizona. The snake because of its formal analogy with 
lightning plays a central role in their traditional secret ceremonies. By the strict observance of these 
ceremonies, the snake allows them to control the rain. According to Aby Warburg, 
[...] The creation of a symbol, for example, the “snake” for the lightning, should be seen as an act of intellectual 
emancipation. Frightened, the Indian seeks to understand the fleeting phenomenon of lightning by comparing it to a 
snake, that he is capable of handling concretely. Better: the two entities merge - and what is remarkable is that, in 
his thoughts, he omits the “like” that maintains separate the two elements of his comparison: for him is the 
lightning snake. [...] If the flash is uncontrollable, we can take control of the snake, although it inspires dread. He 
can make it part of his body (Fritz Saxl in Warburg, 2011). 
In our region, advertisers have long understood our primitive inclination to the lack of distinction 
between signifier and signified by loading with world any object they wish to make desirable. Thus, 
everything is done to make us believe that Michael Jordan, a well-known basketball player, jumps so 
high thanks to the magic shoes he wears and not because of a long and repeated training. Just like the 
snake and the lightning for the Hopi, a symbol can be defined as a three-dimensional object: spatial, 
temporal and social (Debray 2001). 
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But if this inclination to the indistinction is, as we said, the prison of the human animal, it is also his 
opportunity since knowledge builds itself through symbolization. It begins, in fact, through the 
establishment of a first connection between a meaning and a thing. Over time, this link will be 
questioned if the man makes the observation of its inadequacy. It continues with the research and the 
definition of a new link which, over time, will himself be questioned. According to Elias, the civilizing 
process would go in the direction of an increasing congruence between meaning and materiality. The 
use of the symbol “sun”, for example, is “more congruent with reality [today] that it was the case a 
hundred or even thousand years ago when we believed that the sun god traveled the sky in his fiery 
chariot” (Elias 2015). Ernst Cassirer explains the emergence of religion to the detriment of magic in 
the same way: 
It is the insufficiency and the failure of the magic that opened the way to religion. It was necessary the decline of 
the magic that gives birth to the religion. The man saw that he had taken for causes what was not, and that all these 
efforts to act all these imaginary causes were unsuccessful. His sentence was sterile his curious ingenuity had 
remained unproductive. He had pulled strings to which nothing was attached (Cassirer 1975). 
Gradually, the human animal has risen from the practice of magic to the practice of religion, science, 
etc. Some troubled periods of history contradict this trend although it seems that the long term 
confirms it. They are there to remind us that this virtuous movement is not guaranteed. 
In art, this quest for knowledge has led to what we name the mimesis. Like the man who, at a young 
age, learns through imitation, humanity through art has started to produce a representation of his 
environment. “Like all other symbolic forms, art is not the simple reproduction of a given reality, 
ready-made. This is one of the paths to an objective view of things and human life. This is not an 
imitation but a discovery of reality” (Cassirer 1975). 
In the book X of the Republic, Plato warns against the so-called imitative arts. He disqualifies them 
through the painter that he relegates to the rank of an imitator in the third position behind the artisan 
(who knows practically how to make a bed) and God (who is at the origin of the concept) (Platon 
1993). Therefore, Plato in the name of a beautiful, good and true world, will throw out of the scene the 
imitative arts in order to deliver the human animal from the false and the deceit. 
Aristotle has a different opinion on the question. He divides human knowledges into three main areas; 
the theoretical (physics, mathematics and metaphysics), practical (ethics and politics) and poetic 
sciences (productions). In the latter, he further distinguishes disciplines who complete nature in 
performing what it is unable to perform (such as, for example, architecture, medicine, shoemaking, 
agriculture, etc.) of those which merely imitate it (as it is the case of sculpture, painting, music, poetry, 
etc.). Although distinct in their end, they join, however, both through the protocol that governs their 
production. By enacting rules, as it was the case for example with the “Beaux Arts”, the human animal 
equally defines the right way to imitate and to complete nature, binding thereby architecture and the 
imitative arts. Moreover, for Aristotle, unlike Plato, the imitative arts product should not be seen from 
the theoretical angle but under the very specific angle of the poetic sciences. This one does not reside 
in a quest for objectivity, but rather for universality. It is precisely there that they educate us on 
ourselves. Moreover, it is because the act of imitating is a source of knowledge, that it is also a source 
of pleasure. Consequently, this source constitutes the first engine of poetry, the consideration of the 
viewer being the second. His satisfaction derives from the representation based simultaneously on the 
feelings and the intelligence required to understand the causal links that constitute the fiction. These 
multiple movements from which emerge a tension in the spectator’s head lead, in the end, to a 
liberating outcome. It relieves the spectator from the tensions generated by the story and, in the same 
movement, from a part of the tensions of his own life. Fiction has, therefore, a power of purgation 
called Catharsis (L'Atelier d'Esthétique 2002). The imitative arts are a source of knowledge and 
balance. There is, therefore, no reason for Aristotle to reject them outside of the city.  
_____ 
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The mimesis is not a copy but rather an imitation. It is more a free reproduction of the nature that does 
not oblige to the accuracy. It departs from the model where it is not appropriate (Littré 1874). Thus, 
Alberti in his treatise on painting writes: “consider always in nature what we want to paint and always 
retain what is the finest and most decent” (L'Atelier d'Esthétique 2002). Like the idealists for whom 
“the painter work for a single purpose: to restore his true nature to nature. The term mimesis is, 
therefore, paradoxical, since more than nature itself, the artist mimics the theoretical principle of this 
nature” (L'Atelier d'Esthétique 2002). This was also the case for the builder of the scene. Like the 
mimesis for painting, the man in the name of ideational representation of our environment, the world, 
determines what is worthy to stand on scene and what is not. “To ‘locate’ himself in a place, to 
organize it, to inhabit it, many actions which presuppose an existential choice: the choice of the 
universe that we are prepared to assume in ‘creating’ it. But this ‘universe’ is always a replica of the 
exemplary universe, created and inhabited by the gods: it, therefore, contributes to the holiness of the 
work of the gods” (Eliade 1957). So begins the battle between the world and the earth as reflected in 
the temple of Göbekli Tepe. Recent discoveries make it possible to believe that progresses in 
agriculture appeared “[…] to support the construction […] of a temple. According to the conventional 
scheme, pioneers began by building a village. From prosperity, they built a temple in the center. 
However, Göbekli Tepe suggests that the temple could have been built first and that afterward a 
village was formed around” (Harari 2015). The hunter-gatherers passed gradually to agriculture during 
the building of the temple which confirms the thesis of Jacques Cauvin : the anteriority of the 
symbolic on the economic. 
Social animal 
Finally, we will answer that man is a social animal. Within a society, he plays a role on scene in the 
name of the great Whole, the world. From the mismatch between the imago mundi that legitimizes his 
role and our environment arises a residue that needs to be concealed. This fact, Edgar Morin calls it 
the principle of exclusion (Morin 1994). Any model excludes not only the ideas that do not conform to 
it, but also the problems that it does not recognize. The scene and the obscene appears therefore with 
the appearance of the concept of welt, world, and its definition. From the scene, the human animal will 
thus extract everything that would prevent him to be what his vision of the world imposes him to be. 
This obscene placing doesn’t always stem from a conscious choice. It imposes itself on the individual 
taken that he is in the bonds of mutual dependencies that attached himself to the others. (Elias 1969). 
In the process of civilization, repression evolves towards a form of auto control in favor of a 
prospective attitude. This phenomenon first appeared among the elites who see it as a means of 
distinction (Elias 1969). It then spreads into the lower classes which are attracted by the desire to 
belong to the upper classes. Thus, in history, nothing indicates that the degree of sensitivity has 
changed for rational reasons. “A lot of taboos that men use in their social relations have [...] not the 
slightest relation to hygiene: they draw their justification in the ‘painful feeling’ that results from their 
breach” (Elias 1969). 
These “painful sensations” induced embarrassment which characterizes the man facing the object that 
brings him in front of the ontological void which constitutes him, precisely what he “refuses to be but 
is nevertheless condemned to be” (Anders 1956) a mortal animal who, without world, wanders. 
According to Elias, the civilizing process is directed towards “privatization” of every bodily function, 
to their rejection in specialized enclosures, out of the sight of the society.  
All bodily functions are invested gradually with a feeling of shame and unwell from a social origin so that at the 
end even the words that evoke the subject are submitted by a set of rules and restrictions; men mutually hide these 
functions and avoid anything that could awaken the memory of those. When this is not possible - we think of the 
wedding - it uses sophisticated social ritual and verbal formulas that respect the norms of modesty, which help to 




The moral and hygienic motivations are only, in the eyes of Elias, a means used to obtain a specific 
behavior from an individual, leaving him the illusion that it is his own choice. This manner of 
imposing behavior on individuals without their knowledge is the object of modern psychological 
theories, especially psychoanalytic. They deal with “conflicts between socially unfeasible instinctual 
forces on the one hand and the model of social requirements anchored in the individual on the other 
hand” (L'Atelier d'Esthétique 2002).  
In a synthetic way, let us remember that the human animal together talking, symbolic and social 
animal, appropriates a part of its environment by arranging a scene on it which is rid of the obscene in 
the name of an ideational world.  
ARCHITECTURE 
From our environment defined by our physiological faculties, we position the scene. It is bounded at 
its edge by a place where the natural meets the supernatural and drilled in many places by special 
locations that are termed sacred. As this is, for example, the case with the scene of the Hopi. It is 
defined, on one hand, by a natural border formed by the shores of the Great Canyon, the snowy 
mountains of Flagstaff, etc beyond which lies the realm of the mistress of the snakes, the Kachina 
spirits, etc. (Perez 2004). And on the other hand, it is drilled in several points by different places that 
enable the communication with “the dead and those who are not born yet”. In the Hopi tradition, these 
points can be a source, a cliff, a mountain, etc. They are fractures “in the homogeneity of space [...] 
symbolized by an ‘opening’, through which it is made possible to pass from a cosmic region to 
another.” (Eliade 1957). More generally, the metaphor used to name some of them is unambiguous, 
the navel, a gap that connects men to their nourishing mother, the earth. This is true for the Greek 
Omphalos (Greek temple), the Roman Ombilicus (Roman city) and the Sipaapu of the Hopi. The latter 
is a hole on the floor of the Kiva, the Hopi’s “temple”, which is mostly blocked by a piece of wood 
that is removed during ceremonies to allow spirits to incarnate. For that reason, these openings are 
called sacred. They cannot, as revealed by its etymology, be touched without being defiled and 
without soiling back because it contains a force that is always ready 
to escape to the outside as a liquid, to discharge like electricity. So it is necessary to protect the sacred from the 
profane [...] It is an active nothingness that debases, degrades, ruins the fullness towards which it is defined. It is, 
therefore, appropriate to ensure a perfect isolation of the sacred and the profane : any contact is fatal to the one as to 
the other (Caillois 1950). 
Hence, it comes the double meaning of the word, that of “sacred” and “cursed” (TLFI 2013). During 
the reconstruction of a Greek temple, for example, irrecoverable pieces could not be evacuated from 
the sanctuary because over time they have been contaminated and became sacred and should, 
therefore, be buried under the new temple. In the same order of idea, the Greek architect stated in their 
specifications, the need to evacuate from the site, within five days, all new stones considered 
unacceptable because of damage (Hellmann 1998). The relationship between the scene and the sacred 
is thus very sensitive. We now understand better why the sacred is kept out of the scene, obscene. 
Approaching one of these special places cannot, therefore, be done without severity and without 
observing codified behaviors. Some, as in the case of the Sipaapu, will require a particular 
arrangement at their edges in order to ensure the right distance between the profane and the sacred, 
between the scene and the obscene. This arrangement is called architecture, a prosthetic surround 
which enables the man to isolate the obscene from the scene by the establishment of an elaborate 
hardware device. This discipline articulates to do so the wall, the figure, and the parergon. These can 
create a distance that preserves the man of an overly abrupt relationship with the obscene. Thus 
offering the religious man “[...] two complementary areas : one where he can act without fear or 
trembling, but where its action uses only his superficial person, the other where a sense of personal 
dependency holds, contains, directs each of his impulses and where he sees himself unconditionally 
_____ 
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compromise” (Caillois 1950). The “profane” man belongs the first environment. He must be preserved 
from the second. Only the priests and the Pythia had the right (and the power) to tread the adyton of 
the Greek temple. “The pilgrim does not enter the classical Greek temples, which is designed for an 
outdoor vision. It is a Doric peripteros around which we turn.“ (Hellmann 1998). The primitive 
architecture may well be, from this point of view, considered like something that is organized around a 
gap. In the Republic, Plato allows us to measure the symbolic charge of this word in reporting us the 
testimony of a person that came back to life: 
... in a certain prodigious place, wherein there are two gaps in the earth next to each other, and also in the heights, 
two other gaps of heaven, right in front [Souls] were telling stories to each other, some moaning and weeping at the 
memory of all they had seen and experienced during their journey under the earth [...] on the contrary, those who 
came from the sky told the happiness she had known and visions of unimaginable beauty (Platon 1993).  
The temple would, for that reason, be this surround in the same time container and ultra signifying 
membrane that lines a gap (in Greek a chaos) enabling man to communicate with the dead’s and the 
gods that are held obscene (hidden or inaccessible). The temple has, therefore, the dual task to prevent 
the mix between the living and the dead and to compensate or even to sublimate the drama being 
played within it by an excess of significance and order. The cave is its natural expression, the lifted 
stone its condensation, the cairn its development, the temple its improvement: a surround of an 
extravagant signifying power that borders a gap (a chaos) from which could gush the dead. Here 
stands, we believe, the mimetic origin of architecture, to contain and to dissolve the drama that is 
being played within it. 
Let’s turn now to the mimetics categories proposed by Roger Caillois in his book Medusa and Cie: 
[...] (1) The transvestite, each time the animal appears to be trying to impersonate the representative of another 
species; (2) the camouflage, [...] thanks to which the animal is able to merge with the environment; (3) intimidation 
finally, when the animal paralyzes or terrifies his attacker or his prey, without that the fear is justified by a 
corresponding risk “ (Caillois 1960). 
It appears that these three categories can be transposed in architecture: intimidation and wall, 
transvestism and figure, camouflage and parergon. In a mimetic perspective, these three devices give 
very concretely to the human animal the ability to hide himself the obscene, but more than that, to hide 
himself that architecture itself hides.  
Wall (ergon) 
The wall, as the artwork, does not hide that it hides. It confines and conceals the obscene while 
assuming its presence as the expression of a limit, a ban, a power and, thereby specifically, the trouble 
or the intimidation that it may cause. Asia Minor in the Hellenistic period was distinguished, for 
example, “by the quality […] and complexity of its fortifications, [These seem ...] to respond more to 
the desire to assert power and independence than to a strict defensive concern” (Hellmann 1998). The 
wall is the symptom of the obscene placing, the ergon, the artwork. It referred to the firmitas in the 
sense that it represents the ideals of the “homo faber, fabricator of the world : permanence, stability, 
duration”. (Arendt 1958). The work can be the support or the protection, vertical and horizontal (roof, 
wall, floor). 
Figure 
The figure, for its part, loads the ergon with world. It is travestite by symbolization. It turns it into a 
signifying from which the signified becomes inextricable for a group or a society. The figure masks 
the wall with the meaning to which it refers. “I do not see a series of walls, but a home” and thus the 
expression of a use (utilitas) that makes sense. This meaning that stops the decryption for Lacan. 
Parergon 
The parergon finally adorns the ergon that supports it. Like the camouflage, it dissolves the artwork, 
the ergon, taking in his volatilization what it hides. If the wall is no longer perceptible, what it 
contains is no longer either. The obscene surrounded by the charms of architecture, the venustas, finds 
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itself sublimated as if by magic. The wall, shall we say, separates, is adorned and disappears. The 
parergon (frame, column or clothing) has no technical or structural function. It fills a gap of another 
order. “Without this lack, the ergon would not need a parergon. The lack of the ergon is the lack of a 
parergon, a clothing or a column which nevertheless remains outside of it “(Derrida 1978). 
The concept of parergon uncovers the special relationship between ergon and parergon. Would it have 
something to do with the trouble that we mentioned concerning the ergon? It is in all cases due to the 
ergon that appears the parergon. As it was perhaps the case for the Cairns of Clava (Inverness, 
Scotland), for example, that have been equipped with raised stone circles several years after it was 
finished or the Greek temples of which “[...] the outer peristyle once adopted for the chief's house, 
reappeared [...] to magnify the temple isolating it, since it is not technically necessary to support a 
heavy roof.” (Hellmann 1998) So, the parergon, fills the lack of the ergon which itself contains the 
obscene. Therefore, it allows us to highlight the double cause of the primitive architecture : the 
obscene is the cause of the ergon which itself is the cause of the parergon. 
CONCLUSION 
The double cause of primitive architecture allows us to emphasize the two meanings of the word void : 
the first meaning puts the human animal in front of the obscene (what exceeds him). The second 
immersed him in the meaning (what corresponds to his dimension). In this light, the Greek temple 
appears as a symbol of the human constitution. It is simultaneously the admission of the existence of 
an uncontrollable power that must be contained and the opposite, namely, the staging of an “absolute” 
knowledge materialized through architecture. Ultimately, the Greek temple seems to be the expression 
of an order based on the repressed consciousness (by the man through the parergon) of the existence of 
a power or a chaos that is beyond human understanding (gods, complexity, …). This collective 
repression forms the “mythical glue” that we mentioned above. From this point of view, building a 
temple is an inaugural gesture since it freezes in the stone a worldview and defines what will be 
worthy of being on the scene and what will not be. We understand therefore why the representation of 
a world, in art the mimesis, is inextricably linked to the dissolving power of architecture, the mimetic. 
It follows from the above, that our man without condition, like our ancestors, illusioned by the 
architectural charms, is finally a man without wall (which nevertheless immures himself). For him, the 
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